This paper addresses the relation between the design of regulatory boards and efficiency. Drawing on capture theory (or interest-group theory) and the tendency of strong group interests to “capture” the political regulation, we develop the hypothesis that regulatory authority concentrated to a single individual outperforms more collegial forms of decision-making when the regulated firms have similar interests. On the other hand, when their interests are more adversarial, multimember decision-making performs as well. We test our hypothesis on the (regulated) markets for mobile and fixed broadband, using broadband penetration as an indicator of efficiency and executive versus collegial decision-making as our key explanatory variable. In the mobile market, the regulated firms are similarly positioned, whereas in the fixed broadband market, the firms typically have adversarial positions, with an incumbent being challenged by entrants. A statistical analysis of regulatory boards in 33 European countries lends support to the hypothesis that regulation of mobile broadband benefits from having a single decision-maker whereas a bureaucratic regulation with more power sharing, functions as well for fixed broadband. Our interpretation is that the risk of special interest influence is higher when the regulated firms’ interests are aligned. The relationship holds under control for relevant geopolitical variables: geographic location, judicial procedures and GDP levels.

Organisé par la Chaire de recherche en études électorales et la Chaire de recherche du Canada en démocratie électorale.

DATE : Mardi 14 janvier, 12h-13h

LIEU : Salle C-4145, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx